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Financial Stability and Casino Debt
David G. Schwartz and Eugene M. Christiansen
Casino operators have always borrowedmoney to construct and improve their resorts.
Beginning in 1999, however, the Las Vegas-based
companies that dominate gambling in Nevada and
many other jurisdictions began taking on unprece-
dented levels of debt. This debt load escalated
from 2005 to 2009, and, though it has since leveled
off, it has left casino operators more highly lever-
aged than ever before. Companies with such high
levels of debt have consequently high interest pay-
ments, which leads to less money available for cap-
ital investment; it also makes them susceptible to
default, should revenues weaken (as casino reve-
nues did from 2008 onward). When extreme
leveraging impacts a casino’s financial performance
and viability as a going concern, it may become a
legitimate area of interest for regulators.
Recently, MGM Resorts International announced
plans to issue $500 million in unsecured debt—not
to pursue an expansion opportunity, but to pay down
existing debt. Added to the company’s existing
$13.45 billion debt, the new issue will increase
MGM Resorts’ indebtedness to nearly $14 billion.
With a market cap of $5.8 billion, MGM has a
debt/capitalization ratio of approximately 240%.1
Companies this highly leveraged (and with corre-
spondingly high interest costs) are extremely sensi-
tive to fluctuations in cash flow, and the past several
years have proven that casino gaming, while it is
still an industry with high profit potential, is prone
to fluctuations in cash flow due to changes in con-
sumer spending and competition from new jurisdic-
tions. The historic levels of debt that many casino
companies have taken on may threaten the future
stability of individual companies and the gaming in-
dustry as a whole.
CAPITAL STRUCTURES
Corporate capital structures are often complex,
constructed of varying percentages of equity and
debt of various kinds at varying rates of interest
and varying dates of maturity. Capital structures
with low ratios of equity to debt are said to be
‘‘highly leveraged.’’ Highly leveraged capital struc-
tures aren’t dangerous in and of themselves: high le-
verage can be an efficient use of equity. High
leverage does, however, mean high interest expense.
As long as credit is readily available and the
borrower maintains its credit-worthiness (or credit
rating)—meaning sufficient free cash flow to com-
fortably cover the cost of servicing its debt—all
will be well. As we will see, all was well with highly
leveraged casino company capital structures for
years. But if credit becomes unavailable for what-
ever reason, or casino operating results deteriorate
and the casino fails to generate enough free cash
to service its debt, leveraged capital structures can
quickly become unstable.
David G. Schwartz is the Director of the Center for Gaming
Research at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, and the author
of several books about gambling, including Cutting the Wire:
Gambling Prohibition and the Internet and Roll the Bones:
The History of Gambling.
Eugene Martin Christiansen is the founder of Christiansen Cap-
ital Advisors, LLC. Mr. Christiansen was part of the advisory
team that supplied the New Jersey Casino Control Commission
with the definition of financial stability codified at 19:43-4 ff. of
the New Jersey Administrative Code.
1Howard Stutz, MGM Resorts to issue $500 million in unse-
cured debt, Las Vegas Review-Journal, Jan. 11, 2012,
available at < http://www.lvrj.com/business/mgm-resorts-to-
issue-500-million-in-unsecured-debt-137097693.html> ; MGM
Resorts, Yahoo! Finance, < http://finance.yahoo.com/q?s=
MGM> .
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Table 1 presents total debt (‘‘total owing’’), the
current portion of total debt, and the remaining or
long-term debt in nominal (or current) dollars for
the Nevada Gaming Abstract’s largest category of
Las Vegas Strip casinos2 for the years 1990 through
2010, and calculates year-over-year percentage
changes in this segment of Nevada’s gaming indus-
try’s total indebtedness over this period. Total debt
for this segment of Nevada’s gaming industry in-
creased from just under $1.1 billion in 1990 to
$17.5 billion in 2010, an increase in total indebted-
ness of $16.5 billion, or 1,557.6%, over this period.
Figure 1 presents the long term debt of Las Vegas
Strip casinos with annual gross gaming revenues
(GGR) of $72 million or more for the years 1990
through 2010 in line chart format. From 1990
through 1998, the long-term debt of large Strip ca-
sinos remained essentially stable below $2 billion.
Long-term debt then increased sharply, rising five-
fold, by $5.1 billion, to $6.3 billion in the year
2000. Long-term debt fluctuated around $6 billion
between the years 2000 and 2004, and then in-
creased even more sharply, reaching a series high
of $19.7 billion in 2009 before declining to $17.4
billion in 2010—about $16.3 billion, or 1,630%,
greater than the $1 billion in long-term debt of
large Strip casinos in 1990.
As Table 1 and Figure 1 illustrate, the indebted-
ness of large Strip casinos increased enormously
in the decade following 1998. Almost all of the in-
crease was in the form of long-term debt. The in-
crease in indebtedness was a product of an era of
easy credit that characterized the early years of
this decade. Strip casinos entered the twenty-first
century with a dominant position in the global mar-
ket for destination resort gaming. The highly favor-
able market economics large Strip properties
enjoyed translated into high and reliable cash
flows, which made them ideal clients for financial
institutions with unprecedented amounts of money
to lend. The temptation to increase the leverage
(the ratio of debt to equity) of their capital structures
was hard for Strip resort management to resist. As
long as Strip resorts continued to generate high
Table 1. Total Debt of Las Vegas Strip Casinos with Gross Gaming Revenue
of $72,000,000 or More (1990–2010)
Total Debt Year-on-Year Change 1990–2010
FY Total Owing Current Portion Remaining Debt % Change of Total Owing (Yr-on-Yr)
1990 1,057,032,338 32,173,753 1,024,858,585
1991 938,620,440 88,642,508 849,977,932 - 11.20%
1992 1,162,684,339 85,487,987 1,077,196,352 23.87%
1993 924,654,015 287,821,763 636,832,252 - 20.47%
1994 1,873,117,454 17,694,671 1,855,422,783 102.58%
1995 1,148,402,289 17,385,140 1,131,017,149 - 38.69%
1996 1,092,369,548 4,799,994 1,087,569,554 - 4.88%
1997 1,460,060,551 172,660,317 1,287,400,234 33.66%
1998 1,135,695,946 20,758,556 1,114,937,390 - 22.22%
1999 3,429,354,835 10,191,555 3,419,163,280 201.96%
2000 6,688,675,075 455,318,331 6,233,356,744 95.04%
2001 6,602,978,856 421,777,422 6,181,201,434 - 1.28%
2002 6,462,443,226 122,085,351 6,340,357,875 - 2.13%
2003 5,442,186,591 12,265,318 5,429,921,273 - 15.79%
2004 5,475,068,395 16,624,280 5,458,444,115 0.60%
2005 7,108,961,097 9,997,286 7,098,963,811 29.84%
2006 9,584,876,124 608,429,951 8,976,446,173 34.83%
2007 11,137,297,389 48,578,098 11,088,719,291 16.20%
2008 18,267,946,018 86,442,662 18,181,503,356 64.02%
2009 19,777,054,370 102,545,809 19,674,508,561 8.26%
2010 17,521,789,871 171,800,316 17,349,989,555 - 11.40%
Average 24.14%
Source: Statistics from fiscal year ( June 1–July 30) balance sheet categories in the annual Nevada Gaming Abstract (< http://gaming.nv.gov/
abstract_rpts.htm > ), Nevada Gaming Control Board. ‘‘Current Portion’’ and ‘‘Remaining Debt’’ are sub-categories of ‘‘Total Owing,’’ the total
amount of debt, from the ‘‘Clark County—Las Vegas Strip Area with Gaming Revenue of $72,000,000 and over’’ balance sheet.
2Casinos with annual gross gaming revenue (GGR or win) of
$72 million or more.
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cash flows and credit remained readily available,
high leverage appeared to be risk-free, an efficient
use of equity.
As a result of these circumstances, the capital
structure which provides the foundation on which
the gaming industry rests was radically transformed.
The transformation went largely unremarked in the
financial press, and the attendant risks publicly
traded casino companies were building into their
balance sheets received little attention from Wall
Street equity analysts covering the industry.
The risks, however, duly materialized, as the
financial crisis of 2007 exposed fault lines in the
gaming industry’s capital structure that for some
companies and resort development projects proved
fatal.
In retrospect, the massive increase in gaming in-
dustry indebtedness that commenced in 1998 was
singularly ill-timed. While the industry was leverag-
ing up its balance sheet, the Las Vegas Strip’s global
monopoly of destination resort gaming was eroding.
Macau opened its market to foreign investment in
the year 2002, stimulating capital investment in
gaming resorts that equaled and then surpassed the
Strip—and generating gross gaming revenue that
by 2008 made Macau the largest gaming market
in the world. In 2010, two mega-destination gaming
resorts opened in Singapore, further diluting the
Strip’s share of the global market for destination re-
sort gaming.
Then, unexpectedly, in August 2007, the credit
markets abruptly froze, precipitating the most seri-
ous financial crisis of modern times and triggering
the worst economic contraction since the Great
Depression.3
For gaming the timing could not have been
worse. Casino companies entered the crisis with
capital structures that were more highly leveraged
than at any time since Nevada’s Corporate Gaming
Acts of 1967 and 1969 removed the barriers to the
direct involvement of publicly traded corporations
in the industry.4 In 2008 alone, Las Vegas Strip ca-
sinos with revenues greater than $72 million added
almost $7 billion of debt, a significant increase
compared to the immediately preceding years. Sev-
eral factors contributed to the increase in industry
indebtedness, but the most important were two lev-
eraged buyouts: of Harrah’s Entertainment (now
Caesars Entertainment) by Apollo Management
and Texas Pacific Group, and of Station Casinos
by Colony Capital and the company’s founders,
the Fertitta family. Neither buyout anticipated the
2007 fiscal crisis and the ensuing recession—why
should they, when these events took most of the
FIG. 1. Long-term debt of Las Vegas Strip casinos with gross gaming revenues of $72,000,000 or more (1990–2010). Source:
Statistics from fiscal year ( June 1–July 30) balance sheet categories in the annual Nevada Gaming Abstract ( < http://
gaming.nv.gov/abstract_rpts.htm> ), Nevada Gaming Control Board.
3The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) an-
nounced on December 1, 2008 that the U.S. economy entered
a recession in December 2007 which ended in the U.S. in
June/July 2009. Determination of the December 2007 Peak in
Economic Activity, NBER (Dec. 2008), < http://www.nber
.org/dec2008.html > .
4William R. Eadington, The Evolution of Corporate Gambling
in Nevada, 6 Nevada Rev. Bus. & Econ. (1982); William R.
Eadington and James S. Hattori, A Legislative History of Gam-
bling in Nevada, 2 Nevada Rev. Bus. & Econ. (1978).
FINANCIAL STABILITY AND CASINO DEBT 195
world by surprise? Things weren’t helped by a large
increase in the current portion of Strip casino resort
debt in 2006, the largest, in nominal dollars, in this
series, or by the fact that in 2006, the year before the
financial crisis hit, Strip indebtedness was at a series
high (Table 1).
Further insight into how radically the industry’s
capital structure was changing in the years leading
up to the financial crisis is provided by Figures
2–4 and Tables 2 and 3.
Figure 2 presents total debt as a percentage of
total capitalization for Las Vegas Strip casinos
FIG. 2. Total debt as a percentage of total capitalization for Las Vegas Strip casinos with gross gaming revenues of $72,000,000 or
more (1990–2010). Source: Statistics from fiscal year ( June 1–July 30) balance sheet categories in the annual Nevada Gaming
Abstract ( < http://gaming.nv.gov/abstract_rpts.htm> ), Nevada Gaming Control Board. Percentage statistics are calculated by di-
viding ‘‘Total Liabilities’’ with ‘‘Total Liabilities and Capital’’ from the ‘‘Clark County—Las Vegas Strip Area with Gaming Rev-
enue of $72,000,000 and over’’ balance sheet. ‘‘Total Liabilities’’ =Total Debt. Total Capitalization= ‘‘Total Liabilities and Capital.’’
FIG. 3. Long-term debt as a percentage of total capitalization for Las Vegas Strip casinos with gross gaming revenues of
$72,000,000 or more (1990–2010). Source: Statistics from fiscal year ( June 1–July 30) balance sheet categories in the annual
Nevada Gaming Abstract ( < http://gaming.nv.gov/abstract_rpts.htm > ), Nevada Gaming Control Board. Percentage statistics
calculated by dividing ‘‘Total Long-Term Debt (Total Owing)’’ with ‘‘Total Liabilities and Capital’’ from the ‘‘Clark County—Las
Vegas Strip Area with Gaming Revenue of $72,000,000 and over’’ balance sheet.
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with gross gaming revenue of $72 million or more,
for the years 1990 through 2010.
Table 2 presents these data in table format.
After fluctuating around 50% of this segment of
the industry’s total capitalization between 1990
and 1994, total debt as a percentage of total capital-
ization fell sharply, reaching a series low of approx-
imately 36% in 1998. Total debt as a percentage of
this segment of the industry’s total capitalization
increased sharply in 1999 and then gradually de-
creased, to about 41% in 2005. Total debt as a per-
centage of this segment of the industry’s total
capitalization then again increased sharply, reaching
a series high of 69% in 2010.
Figure 3 presents the long-term portion of total
debt as a percentage of total capitalization for Las
Vegas Strip casinos with gross gaming revenue of
$72million ormore for the years 1990 through 2010.
Table 3 presents these data in table format.
After fluctuating between approximately 25% and
31%of this segment of the industry’s total capitaliza-
tion between 1990 and 1994, long-term debt as a per-
centage of total capitalization fell sharply, reaching a
series low of approximately 12% in 1998. Long-term
debt as a percentage of this segment of the industry’s
total capitalization increased sharply between 1998
and the year 2000 and then gradually decreased to
about 28% in 2004. Long-term debt as a percentage
of this segment of the industry’s total capitalization
then again increased sharply, rising above 42% of
total capitalization in 2009.
FIG. 4. Debt and assets less liabilities (‘‘capital’’) for Las Vegas Strip casinos with gross gaming revenues of $72,000,000 or
more (1990–2010). Source: Statistics from fiscal year ( June 1–July 30) balance sheet categories in the annual Nevada Gaming
Abstract ( < http://gaming.nv.gov/abstract_rpts.htm > ), Nevada Gaming Control Board. ‘‘Total Liabilities’’ and ‘‘Total Capital’’
are statistical categories for the ‘‘Clark County—Las Vegas Strip Area with Gaming Revenue of $72,000,000 and over’’ balance
sheet. ‘‘Capital,’’ as used in the Abstract, is equivalent to total assets less total liabilities. ‘‘Total Liabilities’’ =Total Debt.
Table 2. Total Debt as a Percentage
of Total Capitalization for Las Vegas Strip
Casinos with Gross Gaming Revenues of $72,000,000
or More (1990–2010)
FY Total Debt Total Capitalization
Total Debt as %
of Total
Capitalization
1990 1,708,220,582 3,459,300,809 49.4%
1991 1,684,886,815 3,644,105,925 46.2%
1992 2,040,325,342 3,706,668,255 55.0%
1993 1,785,649,376 3,645,576,982 49.0%
1994 3,530,285,299 6,288,677,366 56.1%
1995 3,077,199,153 6,819,981,595 45.1%
1996 2,711,779,234 7,065,807,316 38.4%
1997 3,108,229,053 8,624,862,695 36.0%
1998 3,337,432,074 9,342,111,178 35.7%
1999 6,303,773,619 11,549,989,392 54.6%
2000 9,927,783,532 18,256,911,364 54.4%
2001 9,560,516,925 18,805,441,273 50.8%
2002 9,137,577,500 18,506,371,725 49.4%
2003 8,731,237,072 19,276,594,120 45.3%
2004 9,199,547,097 21,263,720,038 43.3%
2005 10,558,951,904 25,684,330,834 41.1%
2006 14,064,240,152 30,904,608,951 45.5%
2007 15,129,538,959 34,291,840,555 44.1%
2008 25,483,221,031 44,801,245,562 56.9%
2009 27,706,263,699 46,397,109,922 59.7%
2010 38,531,703,692 55,915,019,916 68.9%
Source: Statistics from fiscal year (June 1–July 30) balance sheet catego-
ries in the annual Nevada Gaming Abstract (http://gaming.nv.gov/
abstract_rpts.htm), Nevada Gaming Control Board. Percentage statistics
are calculated by dividing ‘‘Total Liabilities’’ with ‘‘Total Liabilities and
Capital’’ from the ‘‘Clark County—Las Vegas Strip Area with Gaming
Revenue of $72,000,000 and over’’ balance sheet. ‘‘Total Liabilities’’=
Total Debt. Total Capitalization= ‘‘Total Liabilities and Capital.’’
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Figure 4 presents debt and assets less liabilities
for Las Vegas Strip casinos with annual gross gam-
ing revenues of $72 million or more for the years
1990 through 2010.
As the foregoing figures and tables show, the
large casino segment of the Las Vegas gaming in-
dustry entered the financial crisis of 2007 with
sharply rising levels of debt. Debt in and of itself
isn’t dangerous as long as corporations (or govern-
ments) are able to service it. The usual measure of
a corporation’s ability to service its debt is the
free cash available. The metric commonly used for
free cash is earnings before interest, taxes, depreci-
ation and amortization, or EBITDA. The ratio of
cash available to service debt, including interest, re-
payment of principal, and lease payments (if any) is
commonly referred to as the coverage ratio. The
higher a corporation’s coverage ratio, the easier it
is for the corporation to obtain credit, other things
being equal.
Table 4 presents interest expense, EBITDA, and
the EBITDA-to-interest coverage ratio for Las
Vegas Strip casinos with annual gross gaming reve-
nue of $72,000,000 or more for the years 1996
through 2010, in nominal or current dollars.
Figure 5 presents the EBITDA-to-interest cover-
age ratio for Las Vegas Strip casinos with annual
gross gaming revenue of $72,000,000 or more for
the years 1996 through 2010, in nominal or current
dollars.
Figure 6 combines the interest expense, EBITDA,
and coverage ratio data presented in Table 4 and
Figure 5 into a single chart (note that the coverage
ratio line in Figure 6 does not key to the chart’s ver-
tical index).
Table 4 and Figure 5 show that the coverage ratio
of the large segment of the Las Vegas Strip gaming
industry dropped precipitously from a series peak of
nearly 17 times in 1997 to 2.6 times in the year
2000. Between the years 2000 and 2007 the cover-
age ratio of the large casino segment of the Las
Vegas Strip gaming industry fluctuated between
two times and three times (with a dip below two
times, to 1.9 times, in 2002). After 2008, however,
reflecting the effects of the financial crisis, the cov-
erage ratio of the large casino segment of the Las
Vegas Strip gaming industry fell sharply, reaching
negative territory (-0.19 times) in 2009 before
Table 3. Long-Term Debt as a Percentage of Total
Capitalization for Las Vegas Strip Casinos with Gross
Gaming Revenues of $72,000,000 or More (1990–2010)
FY Long-Term Debt
Total
Capitalization
Long-Term Debt
as a % of Total
Capitalization
1990 1,057,032,338 3,459,300,809 30.6%
1991 938,620,440 3,644,105,925 25.8%
1992 1,162,684,339 3,706,668,255 31.4%
1993 924,654,015 3,645,576,982 25.4%
1994 1,873,117,454 6,288,677,366 29.8%
1995 1,148,402,289 6,819,981,595 16.8%
1996 1,092,369,548 7,065,807,316 15.5%
1997 1,460,060,551 8,624,862,695 16.9%
1998 1,135,695,946 9,342,111,178 12.2%
1999 3,429,354,835 11,549,989,392 29.7%
2000 6,688,675,075 18,256,911,364 36.6%
2001 6,602,978,856 18,805,441,273 35.1%
2002 6,462,443,226 18,506,371,725 34.9%
2003 5,442,186,591 19,276,594,120 28.2%
2004 5,475,068,395 21,263,720,038 25.7%
2005 7,108,961,097 25,684,330,834 27.7%
2006 9,584,876,124 30,904,608,951 31.0%
2007 11,137,297,389 34,291,840,555 32.5%
2008 18,267,946,018 44,801,245,562 40.8%
2009 19,777,054,370 46,397,109,922 42.6%
2010 17,521,789,871 55,915,019,916 31.3%
Source: Statistics from fiscal year ( June 1–July 30) balance sheet cate-
gories in the annualNevadaGamingAbstract (http://gaming.nv.gov/
abstract_rpts.htm> ), Nevada Gaming Control Board. Percentage statis-
tics calculated by dividing ‘‘Total Long-Term Debt (Total Owing)’’ with
‘‘Total Liabilities and Capital’’ from the ‘‘Clark County—Las Vegas
Strip Area with Gaming Revenue of $72,000,000 and over’’ balance
sheet.
Table 4. Interest Expense, EBITDA,
and EBITDA-To-Interest Coverage Ratio
for Las Vegas Strip Casinos with Gross Gaming
Revenues of $72,000,000 or More (1996–2010)
FY Interest Expense EBITDA Coverage Ratio
’96 113,271,236 1,472,945,538 13.00370323
’97 84,302,385 1,430,096,252 16.96388841
’98 104,326,762 1,443,046,393 13.83198678
’99 303,619,939 1,554,348,230 5.119387861
’00 650,718,088 1,717,455,112 2.63932284
’01 923,488,352 2,158,476,274 2.337307525
’02 752,065,351 1,396,774,969 1.857252122
’03 716,114,481 2,079,911,258 2.904439602
’04 761,451,248 2,580,519,313 3.388948826
’05 822,937,550 2,804,153,276 3.407492192
’06 1,168,130,572 3,334,106,317 2.854224003
’07 1,130,636,815 3,707,318,261 3.27896475
’08 1,398,766,007 3,490,268,087 2.495248004
’09 1,869,151,835 (365,138,632) - 0.195349904
’10 1,944,945,399 1,645,357,072 0.845965688
Source: Statistics from fiscal year ( June 1–July 30) income statements
for this industry segment in the annual Nevada Gaming Abstract
(< http://gaming.nv.gov/abstract_rpts.htm> ), Nevada Gaming Control
Board. The ‘‘Clark County—Las Vegas Strip Area with Gaming Reve-
nue of $72,000,000 and over’’ income statement accounting items for
EBITDA (‘‘Interest Expense’’ + ‘‘Net Income (- Loss) Before Federal
Income Taxes and Extraordinary Items’’ + ‘‘Depreciation – Buildings’’
+ ‘‘Depreciation and Amortization—Other’’) and Coverage Ratio
(EBITDA/‘‘Interest Expense’’).
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recovering somewhat in 2010, albeit still below one
times (0.85 times) in that year. Figure 6 shows that
the reason for the coverage ratio of the large casino
segment of the Las Vegas Strip gaming industry’s
fall into negative territory in 2009 was the combina-
tion of an increase in interest expense and a very
sharp decline in free cash or EBITDA.
The descent of the Las Vegas Strip’s large casino
segment coverage ratio into negative territory in
2009 is a sign that the industry was experiencing
acute financial distress. Corporations with negative
coverage ratios are in imminent danger of default or
bankruptcy.
Default and bankruptcy is exactly what Las Vegas
encountered. For the gaming industry the one-two
punch of suddenly frozen credit markets followed
by severe recession constituted a perfect storm.
Seemingly overnight, leveraged capital structures
FIG. 5. EBITDA-to-interest coverage for Las Vegas Strip casinos with gross gaming revenues of $72,000,000 or more (1996–
2010). Source: Statistics from fiscal year ( June 1–July 30) income statements for this industry segment in the annual Nevada
Gaming Abstract ( < http://gaming.nv.gov/abstract_rpts.htm > ), Nevada Gaming Control Board. The ‘‘Clark County—Las
Vegas Strip Area with Gaming Revenue of $72,000,000 and over’’ income statement reports accounting items for EBITDA (‘‘Inter-
est Expense’’ + ‘‘Net Income (- Loss) Before Federal Income Taxes and Extraordinary Items’’ + ‘‘Depreciation – Buildings’’ +
‘‘Depreciation and Amortization—Other’’) and Coverage Ratio (EBITDA/’’Interest Expense’’).
FIG. 6. Interest expense, EBITDA, and EBITDA-to-interest expense coverage for Las Vegas Strip casinos with gross gaming
revenues of $72,000,000 or more (1996–2010). Source: Statistics from fiscal year ( June 1–July 30) income statements for this in-
dustry segment in the annual Nevada Gaming Abstract ( < http://gaming.nv.gov/abstract_rpts.htm> ), Nevada Gaming Control
Board. The ‘‘Clark County—Las Vegas Strip Area with Gaming Revenue of $72,000,000 and over’’ income statement reports ac-
counting items for EBITDA (‘‘Interest Expense’’ + ‘‘Net Income (- Loss) Before Federal Income Taxes and Extraordinary Items’’ +
‘‘Depreciation – Buildings’’ + ‘‘Depreciation and Amortization—Other’’) and Coverage Ratio (EBITDA/‘‘Interest Expense’’).
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that had appeared sound became unstable. Without
access to credit, debt could not be re-financed and
rolled over. Worse, as the recession took hold, con-
sumers reduced their visits to Strip properties and
curtailed their spending in casino resorts. Casino
cash flows dwindled. A wave of bankruptcies and
cancelled construction projects rippled through the
industry.
Table 5 lists some notable Las Vegas Strip casino
company defaults and halted resort developments
following the 2007 credit crisis. The list is not
exhaustive: some major problems precipitated or
exacerbated by the credit crisis, including the finan-
cially troubled $9.2 billion CityCenter project, are
omitted.
The twin impacts of the financial crisis and reces-
sion on the gaming industry were not confined to
defaults and bankruptcies. The stock prices of pub-
licly traded casino companies were also adversely
affected.
Figure 7 presents the prices of the common stock
of three of the largest publicly traded casino compa-
nies (all with large resorts on the Las Vegas Strip)
for the years 2006 through 2011.
The prices of the common stock of all three com-
panies rose through 2006 and the first six months of
2007, reaching a peak in the summer of that year.
When credit markets abruptly shut down in August
2007, the stock of all three companies dropped pre-
cipitously, reaching a low point in the first quarter of
2009. The stock price of Wynn Resorts, which (like
Las Vegas Sands) had made an early and highly suc-
cessful investment in Macau and, moreover, entered
the financial crisis with a less highly leveraged bal-
ance sheet than MGM or Las Vegas Sands, quickly
recovered from its first quarter of 2009 low; analyst
Table 5. Notable Las Vegas Casino Credit Defaults Following the 2007 Credit Crisis
Event
Herbst Gaming March 22, 2009—Herbst files for bankruptcy. Slot machine and casino operations are placed
in separate holding companies.
May 23, 2011—Emerges from bankruptcy in December 2010. Name changed to Affinity
Gaming LLC.
The Cosmopolitan January 2008—Developer 3700 Associates defaults on $760M loan for the $3.5 billion casino
resort project.
Deutsche Bank forecloses and opens the resort on December 15, 2010.
Fontainebleau Resort Las Vegas June 9, 2008—Fontainebleau Las Vegas LLC and two affiliates halt construction of the $2.9
billion resort-casino project and file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.
January 27, 2010—Carl Ichan wins auction to control Fontainebleau Las Vegas with a bid of
$150 million. Icahn has not restarted construction.
Echelon Place August 1, 2008—Boyd Gaming halts construction of $4.8 billion hotel, casino, shopping, and
convention complex.
Tropicana Resort & Casino April 2008—Tropicana Entertainment, the parent company, defaults on $1.3 billion credit line
used to purchase casino in 2006.
May 2008—Tropicana Entertainment files for bankruptcy protection.
May 5, 2009—Tropicana Entertainment emerges from bankruptcy.
Station Casinos July 28, 2009—Station Casinos Inc., taken private by Fertitta family and Colony Capital LLC
on November 7, 2007 in $5.4 billion LBO, files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.
June 2011—Station Casinos exits bankruptcy.
Source(s): Caroline Bleakley, Affinity Gaming Drops Herbst Name in ‘‘Fresh Start,’’ Las Vegas Review-Journal, May 23, 2011, available at
< http://www.8newsnow.com/story/14698876/affinity-gaming-drops-herbst-name-in-fresh-start > ; UPDATE 1-Herbst Gaming files for Chapter 11
protection, Reuters.com (Mar. 22, 2009),
< http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/03/22/herbst-bankruptcy-idUSN2254367720090322 > ;Deutsche Bank still seeks partners for Vegas resort,
Reuters.com (Aug. 7, 2008), < http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/08/07/cosmopolitan-lasvegas-idUSN0736042720080807 > ; Jennifer Robin-
son, Analysts’ projections sour, Las Vegas Review-Journal, Aug. 2, 2008, available at < http://www.lvrj.com/news/26204219.html> ; Steve
Green, Fontainebleau developer files for bankruptcy; more jobs cut, Las Vegas Sun, June 9, 2009, available at < http://www.lasvegassun.com/
news/2009/jun/09/fontainebleau-developer-files-bankruptcy/> ; Arnold M. Knightly, Icahn wins auction to buy Fontainebleau for $150 million,
Las Vegas Review-Journal, Jan. 27, 2010, available at < http://www.lvrj.com/news/breaking_news/Icahn-82795542.html > ; Jonathan Keeh-
ner and Bradley Keoun, Defaults in Las Vegas turn investment banks into decorators, N.Y. Times, June 23, 2008, available at < http://www.ny
times.com/2008/06/23/business/worldbusiness/23iht-deutsche.4.13924936.html > ; Arnold M. Knightly, Company emphasizes need to restructure
debt; casino operations unaffected, Las Vegas Review-Journal, July 28, 2009, available at < http://www.lvrj.com/business/51922932.html > ;
Julie Triedman, After Two Rocky Years, Station Casinos Exits Bankruptcy, The Am Law Daily, June 20, 2011, available at < http://amlawdaily
.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2011/06/stationcasinosexit.html > .
200 SCHWARTZ AND CHRISTIANSEN
concerns that MGM and Las Vegas Sands might be
unable to avoid default were, however, widespread,
and the stock price of both companies remained
under pressure through the balance of 2009. The
stock price of Las Vegas Sands, which had diversi-
fied its Las Vegas holdings with an early, highly
successful investment in Macau and a highly suc-
cessful investment in Singapore, recovered to its
pre-financial crisis level in the fourth quarter of
2010, although less robustly than Wynn Resorts.
The stock price of MGMResorts, however, remained
below the stock price ofWynn Resorts and Las Vegas
Sands through the beginning of 2012, reflecting con-
tinuing investor concerns about the company’s expo-
sure to CityCenter.
FINANCIAL STABILITY AS A
REGULATORY CONCERN
The events of the last 18 months demonstrate that
some widely held beliefs about casino gaming are
myths. Gaming is not recession proof. Casinos are
not automatically extraordinarily profitable—or prof-
itable at all. Casinos will not automatically solve any
and all problems and accomplish any and all public
policy goals: e.g., attract millions of tourists, generate
unlimited new tax revenues, employ thousands of
people indefinitely and make investors rich.
Casinos can become financially unstable. Casi-
nos can fail. They can fail quickly, or they can fail
gradually, over a period of decades, through neglect
and insufficient refreshment capital spending—as
has happened in Atlantic City.
More often than not, such failure is caused by fi-
nancial instability. Leveraged capital structures that
reliably support casino companies for years, and
even decades, can become unstable overnight if
new competition materializes in neighboring juris-
dictions, or credit markets close, or recession causes
consumers to markedly reduce spending in casino
properties.
This happened in Las Vegas in 2008 and 2009.
What has happened once can happen again. Finan-
cially unstable casinos are likely to reduce labor
costs in an effort to avoid default. In bankruptcy ca-
sino jobs and gaming’s contribution to the economy,
and the tax receipts gaming generates for govern-
ment, may be lost altogether.
The financial stability of casino licensees is thus
a legitimate regulatory concern. Financial stability
is a regulatory concern in New Jersey, because in
the late 1980s, the highly leveraged capital struc-
tures of some Atlantic City casinos did become un-
stable. Confronted with the prospect of the default
or bankruptcy of its licensees, the New Jersey
Casino Control Commission engaged financial ad-
visors to provide it with a definition of financial sta-
bility. This definition of financial stability was duly
incorporated into New Jersey’s gaming regulations
and is presented as an appendix. In the years since
its adoption, financial stability has been an impor-
tant part of New Jersey’s regulation of its gaming
industry.
FIG. 7. Stock price for MGM Resorts International (MGM), Las Vegas Sands Corp. (LVS), and Wynn Resorts Ltd. (WYNN)
(2006–2012). Source: Yahoo! Finance < http://finance.yahoo.com> .
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This is not to say every jurisdiction that
licenses casinos should emulate New Jersey and
adopt identical regulations governing the financial
stability of its licensees. Decisions concerning ap-
propriate levels of balance sheet leverage are in
the first instance management prerogatives. Cor-
porate management—chief financial officers and
chief executive officers—are charged with the
responsibility of making this decision, and are
by virtue of their positions uniquely qualified to
make them.
But corporate management is fallible, and, as the
Las Vegas experience in the recent financial crisis
and recession demonstrates, can make decisions that
result in levels of indebtedness that can in the wrong
circumstances prove extremely dangerous. The dan-
ger is greatest in jurisdictions like Nevada—where
gaming is the largest single component of the econ-
omy and the largest source of government reve-
nue—but it is present to greater or lesser degree in
every jurisdiction that licenses casinos. As such, fi-
nancial stability is a legitimate regulatory concern.
(Appendix follows/)
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APPENDIX
SUBCHAPTER 4. FINANCIAL
STABILITY OF CASINO LICENSEES
AND APPLICANTS
19:43-4.1 Definitions
19:43-4.2 Financial stability
19:43-4.3 Continuing assessment of financial
condition
19:43-4.4 Financial stability reporting
requirements
19:43-4.5 Failure to demonstrate financial
stability
19:43-4.1 Definitions
The following words and terms, when used in this
subchapter, shall have the following meanings:
‘‘Affiliate’’ is defined at N.J.A.C. 19:40-1.2.
‘‘Capital and maintenance expenditures’’ means
expense items related to the approved casino
hotel which are incurred in connection with furni-
ture, fixtures, equipment and facilities, and capital-
ized costs. Such term shall include acquisition;
replacement; repairs; refurbishment; renovation;
improvements; maintenance, including public area
housekeeping, and labor.
‘‘Casino bankroll’’ means cash maintained in the
casino, excluding any funds necessary for the nor-
mal operation of the casino, such as change banks,
slot hopper fills, slot booths, cashier imprest funds
and redemption area funds.
‘‘Equivalent provisions’’ means lines of credit,
parent company guarantees, or other arrangements
approved by the Commission through which funds
can be accessed on a timely and as needed basis.
‘‘Gross operating profit’’ means net revenues less
operating expenses, as reflected on the casino
licensee’s or applicant’s Casino Control Commis-
sion Statement of Income.
‘‘Material debt’’ means debt of $25,000,000 or
more, whether in a single transaction or cumulative
transactions during any 12 month period, or such
other amount as the Commission may, at the time
of licensure or license renewal, determine is appro-
priate to ensure the continued financial stability of a
casino licensee or applicant.
‘‘Operating expenses’’ means the total of cost of
goods and services; selling, general and administra-
tive expenses, and the provision for doubtful
accounts as indicated on the casino licensee’s or ap-
plicant’s Casino Control Commission Statement of
Income.
Effective: 12/21/92
As amended, effective: 07/06/93
19:43-4.2 Financial stability
(a) Each casino licensee or applicant shall estab-
lish its financial stability by clear and convincing
evidence in accordance with section 84(a) of the
Act and this subchapter.
(b) The Commission may consider any relevant
evidence of financial stability; provided, however,
that a casino licensee or applicant shall be consid-
ered to be financially stable if it establishes by
clear and convincing evidence that it meets each
of the following standards:
1. The ability to assure the financial integrity
of casino operations by the maintenance of
a casino bankroll or equivalent provisions
adequate to pay winning wagers to casino
patrons when due. A casino licensee or ap-
plicant shall be found to have established
this standard if it maintains, on a daily
basis, a casino bankroll, or a casino bank-
roll and equivalent provisions, in an
amount which is at least equal to the
average daily minimum casino bankroll
or equivalent provisions, calculated on a
monthly basis, for the corresponding
month in the previous year. For any casino
licensee or applicant which has been in
operation for less than a year, such amount
shall be determined by the Commission
based upon levels maintained by a compa-
rable casino licensee;
2. The ability to meet ongoing operating ex-
penses which are essential to the mainte-
nance of continuous and stable casino
operations. A casino licensee or applicant
shall be found to have established this stan-
dard if it demonstrates the ability to achieve
positive gross operating profit, measured
on an annual basis;
3. The ability to pay, as and when due, all
local, State and Federal taxes, including
the tax on gross revenues imposed by sub-
section 144(a) of the Act, the investment
alternative tax obligations imposed by
subsection 144(b) and section 144.1 of the
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Act, and any fees imposed by the Act and
Commission rules;
4. The ability to make necessary capital and
maintenance expenditures in a timely man-
ner which are adequate to ensure mainte-
nance of a superior first class facility of
exceptional quality pursuant to subsection
83(i) of the Act. A casino licensee or appli-
cant shall be found to have established this
standard if it demonstrates that its capital
and maintenance expenditures, over the
five-year period which includes the three
most recent calendar years and the upcom-
ing two calendar years, average at least
five percent of net revenue per annum, ex-
cept that any casino licensee or applicant
which has been in operation for less than
three years shall be required to otherwise
establish compliancewith this standard; and
5. The ability to pay, exchange, refinance or ex-
tend debts, including long-term and short-
term principal and interest and capital lease
obligations, which will mature or otherwise
come due and payable during the license
term, or to otherwise manage such debts
and any default with respect to such debts.
The Commission also may require that a ca-
sino licensee or applicant advise the Com-
mission and Division as to its plans to meet
this standard with respect to any material
debts coming due and payable within 12
months after the end of the license term.
Effective : 12=21=92
As amended, effective: 03/18/96
19:43-4.3 Continuing assessment
of financial condition
(a) No casino licensee shall consummate a mate-
rial debt transaction which involves the following
without the prior approval of the Commission.
Any transaction not specified in this subsection
shall not require prior Commission review and ap-
proval with regard to the financial stability stan-
dards set forth in this subchapter.
1. An agreement which provides for any bor-
rowing for a purpose other than capital and
maintenance expenditures; or
2. A guarantee of the debt of an affiliate,
whether by cosignature or otherwise; an as-
sumption of the debt of an affiliate, or an
agreement to place any encumbrance on
its approved casino hotel facility to secure
the debts of an affiliate.
(b) In reviewing any transaction pursuant to (a)
above, the Commission shall consider whether the
transaction would deprive the casino licensee of fi-
nancial stability, as defined by N.J.A.C. 19:43-4.2,
taking into account the financial condition of the af-
filiate and the potential impact of any default on the
licensee.
(c) Any subsequent use of the proceeds of a
transaction previously approved by the Commission
pursuant to (a) above, including subsequent draw-
ings under previously approved borrowings, shall
not require further Commission approval.
(d) The Commission may restrict or prohibit the
transfer of cash to, or the assumption of liabilities on
behalf of, an affiliate if, in the judgment of the Com-
mission, such transfer or assumption would deprive
the casino licensee of financial stability as defined
by N.J.A.C. 19:43-4.2.
Effective : 12=21=92
19:43-4.4 Financial stability reporting
requirements
(a) Each casino licensee shall file with the Com-
mission and Division the following:
1. A statement of compliance with the criteria
in N.J.A.C. 19:43-4.2(b), which shall be in-
cluded in the quarterly reports filed by the
casino licensee pursuant to N.J.A.C.
19:45-1.6;
2. At the end of each calendar year:
i. An annual forecast by calendar quarters of
the operating and financial performances
of the casino licensee for the upcoming
calendar year, including statement of in-
come and balance sheet, which shall be
submitted in the standard format pre-
scribed by the Commission or such other
format approved by the Commission; and
ii. A detailed analysis of compliance with
N.J.A.C. 19:43-4.2(b)4; and
3. Such other information as the Commission
or Division shall deem material to a show-
ing of financial stability for a particular ca-
sino licensee.
Effective : 12=21=92
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19:43-4.5 Failure to demonstrate financial stability
In the event that a casino licensee or applicant
fails to demonstrate financial stability, the Commis-
sion may take such action as is necessary to fulfill
the purposes of the Act and to protect the public
interest, including but not limited to: issuing
conditional licenses, approvals or determinations;
establishing an appropriate cure period; imposing
reporting requirements in excess of those other-
wise mandated by these regulations; placing such
restrictions on the transfer of cash or the assump-
tion of liabilities as is necessary to insure future
compliance with the standards set forth in N.J.A.C.
19:43-4.2(b); requiring the maintenance of reason-
able reserves or the establishment of dedicated or
trust accounts to insure future compliance with the
standards set forth in N.J.A.C. 19:43-4.2(b); denying
licensure; appointing a conservator pursuant to sec-
tion 130.1 et seq. of the Act.
Effective : 12=21=92
FINANCIAL STABILITY AND CASINO DEBT 205
